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Abstract
While expert information and information on public preferences are seen as key resources that interest groups
provide to policymakers, little is known about the resources that are necessary to acquire such information.
Existing scholarship argues that financial resources enhance a group’s ability to supply information, which
could be problematic as it suggests that resource poor groups are disadvantaged when lobbying policymakers.
Applying a resource perspective to informational lobbying, this paper argues that different information types
require different resources and that financial means are less important than assumed. The predictions are tested
using a new dataset and survey of 383 advocates active on 50 specific policy issues in five West European
countries. The results show that while economic resources are indeed associated with a higher amount of expert
information, political capacities allow a group to provide both expert information and information on public
preferences. This suggests that groups can rely on other than economic resources for information provision.
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Introduction
Information provision is a key aspect of lobbying. Policymakers need expert information, that is,
technical information to anticipate the effectiveness of a policy proposal as well as information on
public preferences to anticipate electoral consequences (Truman, 1951; Wright, 1996; Baumgartner
and Jones, 2015). Consequently, information has often been seen as the ‘currency in lobbying’
(Chalmers, 2013) or the ‘stock in trade’ (Nownes, 2006) and as a resource that interest groups provide
to policymakers in exchange for access and influence (Bouwen, 2002; Chalmers, 2013; De Bruycker,
2016). The fact that policymakers need information that interest groups have leads to an information
asymmetry (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989: 460; Ainsworth, 1993: 47; Baumgartner and Jones, 2015) and
makes information a potential source of influence for interest groups.1 However, information gath-
ering and transmission is costly and requires resources itself (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992;
Wright, 1996). Yet little is known about the costs of such information which is why the paper sets
out to assess the costs of information provision. Given that advocates lobby, by and large, on specific
policy proposals (Burstein, 2014), the information that is necessary for legislative lobbying is not
necessarily off-the-shelf information. For example, an organization may have overall knowledge
on the fuel emissions of cars but lacks information on the impact of auto exhaust fumes on humans.
Obtaining such information requires resources such as staff, money, or research capacities.
© European Consortium for Political Research 2019. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1Lobbying, thus, is defined as the strategic communication of information and ‘interest groups achieve influence through
the acquisition and strategic transmission of information that legislators need to make good public policy and get reelected’
(Wright, 1996: 2).
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Scholars have argued that there is a relationship between financial resources and the amount of
information they supply (Klüver, 2012; Dür and Mateo, 2014), and that information provision is a
function of a group’s internal capacities (Bouwen, 2002; De Bruycker, 2016). This suggests that
actors with more resources can provide more information and subsequently enhance their chan-
ces of lobbying success. However, variation in the extent to which advocates are able to provide
information can cause bias and foster political inequality (Schattschneider, 1960; Schlozman and
Tierney, 1986). This is problematic from a normative perspective as it favours actors that are able
to pay the costs of information-gathering (Hall and Deardorff, 2006: 81). Moreover, interest
groups are often portrayed as transmission belts of the public (cf. Truman, 1951; Gilens and
Page, 2014; Rasmussen et al., 2014; Lowery et al., 2015), by passing on information about public
preferences to policymakers (Bevan and Rasmussen, 2017; Eising and Spohr, 2017). If more
resources facilitate the transmission of such information, it poses a threat to representation as
it favours those that are well endowed (Schattschneider, 1960). Hence, the cost of gathering
information can introduce bias and favour resourceful groups (Schattschneider, 1960) that do
not only dominate in terms of sheer numbers (Schattschneider, 1960; Baumgartner and Leech,
2001) but may also provide more and better arguments. Understanding the costs of information
may hence contribute to our understanding of bias in interest representation.
The paper contributes to this debate by applying a resource perspective on informational lob-
bying. While previous research argues that higher material resources lead to more information
provision (cf. Klüver, 2012), interest groups have other capacities that may be valuable as well.
In addition to economic resources, which are defined as an organization’s financial means, groups
possess political capacities. Political capacities refer to the ability to represent the public or a con-
stituency (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Binderkrantz et al., 2015; Daugbjerg et al., 2018), to act as a
mediating actor between citizens and policymakers (Berkhout et al., 2017b), but also to mobilize
the public and generate support (Dür and Mateo, 2013; Fraussen and Beyers, 2016; Daugbjerg
et al., 2018). The paper argues that while the provision of expert information indeed requires
economic resources, information on public preferences can, above all, be acquired with a group’s
political capacities rather than its economic resources. Empirically, the paper relies on new data
collected within the GovLis project.2 The dataset comprises interest group activity on 50 specific
policy issues in five West European countries (Denmark, Sweden, Germany, UK, and the
Netherlands) and relies on detailed media coding, expert interviews, desk research, and a survey.
This research design allows for analyzing information that advocates have provided on a variety of
specific policy issues and covers different systems of interest representation.
The findings indicate both similarities and differences in how resources affect the different
types of information provision. While economic resources facilitate the provision of expert infor-
mation, political capacities are also associated with a higher provision of expert information. This
could suggest that even if groups do not have a lot of economic resources, they can still acquire
expert information by using their political capacities. Political capacities also facilitate the provi-
sion of information about public preferences, while there is less evidence for economic resources.
Actors drawing on their political capacities are therefore also more likely to provide both types of
information. The paper adds to the literature on informational lobbying (De Bruycker, 2016;
Nownes and Newmark, 2016) by assessing the drivers of information provision, in particular,
the types of resources that are necessary for gathering information. By showing a relationship
between resources and information provision, it supports research that argues that information
is costly and can be used strategically (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992; Wright, 1996) but adds
that the costs and resources may vary depending on the type of information. Moreover, it suggests
that if groups do not spend economic resources on lobbying activities (Dür and Mateo, 2013;
Rasmussen, 2015; Binderkrantz et al., 2016; De Bruycker, 2016), they may have the potential
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The costs of information
As mentioned, policymakers need political and expert information, which interest groups are able to
provide (De Bruycker, 2016). Expert information in this paper is defined as information on technical
details, the effectiveness of a policy, its legal aspects as well as its economic impact. Political information
is often used to pressure policymakers and will be defined in this paper as information on public pref-
erences, referring to information on public preferences, electoral consequences, or moral concerns
(ibid.: 601). Importantly, this is not restricted to general public opinion but also includes information
of a specific constituency such as members or a somewhat broader constituency that will allegedly
benefit from the lobbying efforts of a group. Information is often seen as a resource (Bouwen,
2002; Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Chalmers, 2013); however, information requires resources itself,
and the ability to provide different kinds of information varies across actors. Moreover, much of
the scholarly work uses group type as a proxy for the type and amount of information that is available
(Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Coen, 2007; Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Dür and Mateo, 2014), when in fact
there are no differences across different types of groups regarding information provision (De Bruycker,
2016; Nownes and Newmark, 2016). Others regard an interest group’s information supply as a func-
tion of its organizational capacity (Bouwen, 2002; De Bruycker, 2016). Indeed, some have shown that
financial resources affect the amount of information an organization is able to provide (cf. Klüver,
2012) and that interest group influence is a function of the extent to which a group is capable of
acquiring and transmitting information that is demanded by policymakers (Chalmers, 2011: 472).
Given that groups differ in the extent to which they can provide information, those with fewer resour-
ces may be disadvantaged. However, while economic resources are undoubtedly important, actors may
be able to use their political capacities to collect and provide information on public preferences.
What resources do interest groups have?
Interest groups possess a variety of resources such as financial means, legitimacy, representativeness,
knowledge, members, or the ability to mobilize the public (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Dür and Mateo,
2014; Binderkrantz et al., 2015; Dür and Mateo, 2016), which will be divided into economic resources
and political capacities. First, all organizations have financial means which can be used on lobbying
activities and fall under economic resources. This includes the material resources an interest group
has spent on lobbying (Klüver, 2012; Dür and Mateo, 2013; De Bruycker, 2016), such as expenses on
lobbying staff or requesting a study. Second, groups have other resources, which will be defined as
political capacities to which the literature has referred to in a number of ways. For the purpose of this
paper, they are categorized as representation and mobilization capacity. Representation capacity is
defined by a group’s ability to speak on behalf of its constituents (Daugbjerg et al., 2018) or the public
at large (Binderkrantz et al., 2015: 99) as well as its close interactions with its members or general
citizens. It also refers to the number of people who are represented by that organization as well as the
knowledge of what the public thinks about an issue (Baumgartner et al., 2009) and a group’s ability to
operate as a mediating organization that aggregates societal interests which are transmitted to the
policymakers (Berkhout et al., 2017b). Mobilization capacity is defined as a group’s ability to obtain
and sustain political support (Daugbjerg et al., 2018) and encompasses the amount of public support
a group can mobilize (Dür and Mateo, 2013; Fraussen and Beyers, 2016: 664). This requires
communication skills, members, and support (Daugbjerg et al., 2018), but not necessarily financial
resources. The following section will elaborate on the underlying mechanisms of how economic
resources and political capacities enable information provision, arguing that while economic resour-
ces may help with the provision of expert information, political capacities are more valuable for
information on public preferences than economic resources.
A resource perspective on informational lobbying
First, economic resources allow an organization to hire staff with the necessary expertise or buy
expertise for a specific issue (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986: 97; Drutman, 2015; Dür and
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Mateo, 2016; Nownes and Newmark, 2016). Even if some – especially resourceful – organizations
have (expensive) research units and in-house expertise for the overall policy area, they have to
expand their portfolio and invest in research to gain information on the specificities of the issue
in question. As an example, a government may want to discuss a new policy proposal regulating
air quality by banning diesel cars in highly polluted areas. A car manufacturer has knowledge on
fuel emissions of its cars but no evidence for the impact of auto exhaust fumes on humans. Having
economic resources, the company could invest in air-pollution research conducted by external
parties and use this information thereafter to provide it to policymakers. This illustrates how
economic capacities allow an organization to expand its issue portfolio (Fraussen, 2014) and
to acquire more specific information. Undoubtedly, this type of information is difficult to access
and costly to acquire. Resource-poorer groups that lack financial resources have a disadvantage in
acquiring and ultimately transmitting such information in a credible manner.
However, political capacities do not necessarily require a large budget (cf. Dür and Mateo,
2013) and can potentially be used to compensate lacking financial resources (Schlozman and
Tierney, 1986; Baumgartner et al., 2009). To understand how such capacities allow the acquisition
of relevant information, it may help to think of interest groups as transmission belts. Interest
groups are commonly described as intermediates between citizens and the policymaking level
by organizing, aggregating, and transmitting public preferences (Truman, 1951; Wright, 1996;
Rasmussen et al., 2014; Eising and Spohr, 2017). Yet it requires certain organizational features
to generate policy-relevant information and act efficiently as a transmission belt, and groups vary
in their capacities to do so (Albareda, 2018; Albareda and Braun, 2018). The capacity to act as a
transmission belt is thus, among other things, determined by how such groups organize their
information flows, that is, how they interact with their members and supporters and how such
information can be channelled to the policymaking level (ibid.). One important feature for acting
as a transmission belt is therefore the capacity to accurately represent the interests of an organ-
ization’s constituents. Groups have to be responsive to their members and supporters to avoid
risking that members leave the organization or withdraw their support, which would ultimately
affect the group’s chance of survival. Hence, groups have to know what their constituents want
and how they could benefit from a policy. The relationship between members, supporters, clients,
and group leaders affects the information capacity of the organization as group leaders learn
through interactions with members and supporters about their preferences (Schlozman and
Tierney, 1986). This makes membership a resource which can help aggregate information (ibid.).
Such interaction does not require a high budget but communication, which can take place via
e-mail, newsletters, events, and social media. These interactions do not only help to generate
information about what (parts of) the public want(s) but should also increase the likelihood of
providing such information to policymakers, as members and supporters expect their group to
use the available information, which can be used to pressure policymakers who care about
electoral consequences.
A second important feature to act efficiently as a transmission belt is the ability to shift policies
in a preferred direction (Albareda and Braun, 2018). While this requires a certain degree of profes-
sionalization and access that allow the transmission of information, groups can also rely on their
mobilization capacity, which demonstrates legitimacy and may help to transmit public preferences
to the policymaking level. Groups that rely on members and supporters are more likely to use their
mobilization capacities to demonstrate their efforts and to satisfy their members (Maloney et al.,
1994). Such mobilization capacities require fewer financial resources3 (Dür and Mateo, 2013: 664),
but rather communication skills and members and supporters (Daugbjerg et al., 2018). The ability
to mobilize large crowds requires that groups have a loyal member and supporter base with whom
3Dür and Mateo consider that some activities (such as massive campaigns) may require a high amount of economic resour-
ces, yet that others (such as press releases or internet campaigns) require considerably less which is why, by and large, these
activities are assumed to require less economic resources (2013: 664).
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they interact and whose preferences they know. A group would be unlikely to start a campaign
without knowing how its members would react to it. The mobilization capacity allows group lead-
ers to generate information about preferences (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992) and estimate
effects and successes of grassroots campaigns (Wright, 1996: 91). The ability to mobilize is also
different from actual outside lobbying as it is about the knowledge of having the ability to mobilize,
which can again be used to pressure policymakers (De Bruycker, 2016). In sum, each type of
resource has its advantage when providing either type of information, which results in the first
two hypotheses.
H1: The effect of economic resources on the provision of expert information is stronger than the
effect of political capacities. (Economic Resources Hypothesis)
H2: The effect of political capacities on the provision of information on public preferences is
stronger than the effect of economic resources. (Political Capacities Hypothesis)
An alternative and competing hypothesis could argue that actors cannot use their political
capacities as economic resources are key for providing information about public preferences.
However, in order to judge whether one type of resource can compensate for the (potential) lack
of the other it is necessary to consider the ability of groups to provide both types of information.
Since policymakers usually demand both expert information and information on public prefer-
ences, interest groups should strive to offer a combination to meet these demands as this might
increase their chance of lobbying success. Undoubtedly, a group may provide one type more than
the other, but groups are generally able to provide a combination (De Bruycker, 2016). However,
groups with high economic resources may be able to also access information on public preferen-
ces, which allows for the provision of a combination of both types of information. Economic
resources can be invested in polling the general public about their position on an issue or in
an expensive media campaign, aimed at shaping public opinion. Especially groups that cannot
make claims of broad appeal and that convey a message that is contested ‘will avoid free but
potentially unflattering media coverage’ and invest in a campaign which they can control
(Schlozman and Tierney, 1986: 171–172). Again, since resourceful groups can expand and adjust
their portfolio, a larger budget can also help a group acquire information on public preferences,
which results in a third hypothesis:
H3: Higher economic resources increase the likelihood of a group providing a combination of expert
information and information on public preferences. (Persistence Hypothesis)
Research design
The model will be tested using data collected within the larger GovLis project (Rasmussen et al.,
2018). The dataset pools information on public opinion and interest group activity on 50 specific
policy issues in five West European countries (Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the UK, and the
Netherlands). Information provision can determine access to policymakers (Bouwen, 2004;
Tallberg et al., 2018), which is why the inclusion of different countries considers variation in
the degree to which interest groups are involved in policymaking; the UK being a country in which
the interest group system is characterized as pluralist while the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden,
and Denmark experience moderate or strong degrees of corporatism (Siaroff, 1999; Jahn, 2016).
While much of the research on informational lobbying has surveyed interest groups about
general information provision in their lobbying activities (cf. Chalmers, 2011; Klüver, 2012;
Nownes and Newmark, 2016), this study applies a design which takes into account that informa-
tion by advocates is typically provided on specific aspects of a proposal and not policymaking in
general. While some interest organizations may mobilize to push general policy in a more right- or
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left-wing direction, most lobbying activities are targeted at specific policy proposals (Beyers et al.,
2014; Berkhout et al., 2017a). The 50 specific policy issues in the data were selected as a stratified
random sample from issues that occurred in nationally representative public opinion polls. Each
policy issue constitutes a concrete policy proposal, which suggests a change of the status quo. The
50 issues in the sample vary moreover with regard to salience, public support, and policy type as
these aspects are likely to have an impact on lobbying activities and lobbying success. Issues in the
sample concern, for example, the question whether to ban smoking in restaurants or to cut social
benefits (see Online Appendix A for more information on the sampling and for a full list of the
policy issues). It should be considered though that opinion polls are likely to be conducted on
relatively salient policy issues. Hence, a sample based on issues that a pollster considered worth
asking does not constitute a completely random sample of policy issues (Burstein, 2014).
However, citizens should have at least somewhat informed opinions if interest groups are expected
to transmit their preferences meaningfully (Gilens, 2012: 50–56). Moreover, the stratified sample
ensures variation with regard to media saliency, which is always added as a control variable.
The final unit of analysis in this paper is an actor on an issue. Actors (or interest groups) are
defined based on their observable, policy-related activities which follows a behavioural definition
of interest groups (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Baroni et al., 2014). Several steps were taken to iden-
tify the actors that mobilized on an issue. First, student assistants coded interest group statements
on the specific policy issue in two major newspapers4 in each country for a period of four years
(Gilens, 2012) or until the policy changed. Second, interviews with civil servants that have worked
on the issue during our observation period (82% response rate) helped to complete the list of
advocates that have mobilized on the issues. Lastly, desk research of formal tools and interactions
such as public hearings or consultations was conducted in order to identify more relevant actors.
Although this triangulation may still have missed some actors, the interviews with civil servants
should help ensure that actors who exclusively focused on less visible inside-lobbying strategies
were also captured. From December 2016 through April 2017, an online survey was conducted
with 1410 advocates identified as active on the specific issues. About 383 answered the questions
regarding the variables relevant for the analysis in this paper (see Online Appendix B1 for full
overview of response rates), which results in a response rate of 27%.
Dependent variables
Following De Bruycker (2016), the paper distinguishes between expert information and informa-
tion on public preferences which results in two dependent variables. Information provision was
measured by inquiring how often, on a 1–5 scale, an actor has used certain arguments (Online
Appendix B2 provides an overview of the exact survey questions). Expert Information consists of
arguments referring to facts and scientific evidence, the feasibility and effectiveness of the
proposed policy, the economic impact for the country as well as the compatibility with existing
legislation (De Bruycker, 2016: 601). The answer categories range from 1 to 5 with 1 meaning
‘never’ and 5 ‘very often’. The values for the different arguments were added and divided by
the number of items so that the final dependent variable is ordinal and ranges from 1 to 5.
Cronbach’s alpha for this variable is 0.74. Information on Public Preferences consists of arguments
referring to public support on the issues (ibid.) as well as fairness and moral principles (Nownes
and Newmark, 2016). The latter has been added to ensure that not only information about general
public opinion is considered but also about how a policy will affect organizations and/or certain
segments of society (Burstein, 2014; Nownes and Newmark, 2016). Again, the items were added
and divided by two so that the final variable ranges from 1 to 5. Cronbach’s alpha for this variable
is 0.77. In addition, the paper tests whether an actor provided a combination of two types of
4Denmark: Politiken and Jyllands-Posten; Germany: Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Netherlands:
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information and therefore provides a third dependent variable. The variable Combination is a
binary variable and relies on the other two dependent variables. The variable takes a 0 if actors
hardly provided any information at all or if an actor provided a lot of one type of information only,
that is, when an actor scores lower than 3 on both types of information or either type of
information. The variable assigns a 1 if an actor scores above 3 on both information on public
preferences and expert information. Online Appendix C1 provides a full overview of all variables
and their distributions.
Independent variables
The main independent variables are economic resources and political capacities. The variable
Economic Resources follows the logic of material resources (cf. Klüver, 2012; Dür and Mateo,
2013). However, instead of asking for the general budget or staff of the organization, it asks about
the extent to which the actor agrees with having spent economic resources on lobbying activities
on that issue. The advantage is that this measures resources that have been devoted to lobbying on
the issue and not the financial or personnel capacity of an organization in general. This is an
ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating strong agreement. The variable Political
Capacities is measured with four different survey items, which capture both the representation
and mobilization capacity. Two items ask about how important it was to the actor to interact with
members or relevant stakeholders on the specific issue, and about the importance of representing
the public on the issue. This operationalization follows research that argues that political capacities
refer to the legitimacy and representativeness a group can provide (Baumgartner et al., 2009;
Fraussen and Beyers, 2016; Daugbjerg et al., 2018). Arguably, the question is more about the
importance, rather than a group’s actual capacity. The measure therefore implies that actors
who considered a certain tactic as important on the specific issue also used it. While this measure
is certainly not ideal, it allows for empirically approaching political capacities such as representa-
tiveness and legitimacy. Two other items ask about the extent to which an actor had public sup-
port and media attention on an issue (again, see Online Appendix B2 for exact survey questions).
This operationalization follows research that argues that political capacities refer to the ability to
mobilize citizens and volunteers (Kollman, 1998; Dür andMateo, 2013: 664; Dür andMateo, 2014;
Binderkrantz et al., 2015: 99). This ability is likely to cause a lot of visibility, which will result in
higher media attention and news reports. All questions range from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating strong
agreement or high importance. The four measures were added and divided by four so that the final
variable ranges from 1 to 5. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.62. To ensure that the relationship
between political resources and information provision is not in fact a relationship between the
outside activities of a group and information provision the analysis will control for that.
Online Appendix C2 provides a correlation matrix, which shows that economic resources are cor-
related with political capacities representation at 0.37, which suggests that these resources are in
fact different.
Control variables
The analyses control for the type of actor providing information as this might influence both the
resources that an actor has and the type of information that is provided. The variable Interest
Group Type follows the categorization of the INTERARENA project (Binderkrantz et al.,
2015) with the addition of firms and experts since these actors are similarly likely to provide
information to policymakers (see Online Appendix D for an overview of the different actor
types).5 The category citizen groups includes public interest groups as well as hobby and identity
groups, thus groups that represent a collective good, rely on members, organize campaigns, and
5An intercoder-reliability test on the same sample resulted in a Krippendorff ’s alpha of 0.92 in distinguishing these
different actor types (effective n=50, 2 raters).
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typically have limited financial resources (Dür and Mateo, 2013; De Bruycker, 2016). Second,
trade unions and occupational groups are membership organizations which can interact a lot with
their members and rely on their hands-on expertise while at the same time have a fair amount of
financial resources due to membership fees (Dür and Mateo, 2013: 663; Rasmussen, 2015: 277).
The third category includes firms and business associations, thus groups that do not rely on in-
dividual members, avoid outside activities, and are likely to be endowed with financial resources
and market power (Klüver, 2011: 5; Dür and Mateo, 2013: 663). Lastly, individual experts, think
tanks, and institutional associations are assumed to be less endowed with material resources than
business groups but more than citizen groups as their strength is their in-house expertise and
research they can provide.
The analysis furthermore includes a control variable for Media Saliency as advocates may be
more likely to provide information on public preferences on highly salient issues, whereas expert
information may be more likely on less salient issues. Saliency is measured by the log of the
average number of newspaper articles containing a statement on the issue per day based on
the two newspapers that were used for the coding. Moreover, a variable that reports the
Policy Type is included which distinguishes between redistributive, distributive, and regulatory
issues (Lowi, 1964). Whereas expert information may be more likely on regulatory issues,
information on public preferences may be more likely on redistributive issues which are likely
to cause more conflicts (Dür and Mateo, 2013: 665). Third, a variable controlling for Outside
Activities is included in the analysis to rule out that the relationship between political capacities
and information provision is in fact a relationship between outside activity and information6
(Dür and Mateo, 2013; Hanegraaff et al., 2016). The variable is based on two items, each of
them surveying advocates about how important they considered activities such as protest or
other activities mobilizing the public, or targeting the press for their work on the issue. All items
were asked on a five-point scale and were added and divided by the number of items. Arguably,
this variable could also be interpreted as a measure of mobilization capacity. However, it meas-
ures actual activity, whereas the mobilization capacity variables measures resources the actors
could rely on.
Another variable controls for the Organizational Salience, that is how important an actor
considered the issue in question compared to other issues. The importance an actor attributed
to an issue may both affect the amount and the type of information provided and the amount of
resources invested. If an issue is not a priority for an organization, the amount of information
provided can be expected to be considerably lower compared to an issue that is high on the
organizational agenda. Similarly, it could be assumed that organizational salience affects the
amount of resources that are spent on collecting information, that is, that an organization is
willing to spend much more resources if a topic is of high importance compared to issues that
are less relevant. This variable ranges from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating that the issue was much
more important compared to the average issue an organization is working on. Lastly, a control
for the Position of an actor has been included as some argue that actors lobby differently
depending on their position on the issue (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Burstein, 2014). As such,
it has been argued that those aiming to challenge the status quo need to invest more to convince
policymakers to risk unforeseeable consequences (Baumgartner et al., 2009), which could
influence the amount as well as the type of information provided. Positions were coded while
identifying the actors and thus rely on manual coding based on media statements, official
documents, and expert opinion.7 If an actor’s position was missing or coded as neutral, the
self-reported position based on the survey was added. Again, a full overview of all variables
can be found in Online Appendix C.
6Outside activity and information on public preferences indeed significantly correlate at 0.64.
7An intercoder-reliability test on the sample resulted in Krippendorff ’s alpha of 0.78 for identifying positions on the issue.
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Analysis
Before turning to the regression analyses, the following section will briefly explore the distribution
of the main variables. Overall, actors tend to provide more expert information (mean of 3.5) than
information on public preferences (mean of 3.1). Furthermore, a majority of the actors provide a
combination of both types of information (60%). A visual inspection illustrates (see Online
Appendix E) that economic resources as well as political capacities are positively associated with
either type of information. It shows that each type of resource could compensate for the (potential)
lack of the other as each resource shows a positive effect on either type of information. The
following part turns to the multivariate regression analyses to test the hypotheses. All analyses
are run as multilevel models with random intercepts for policy issues to account for the hetero-
geneity of different issues and fixed effects for countries to control for unobserved differences
across countries. Since the dependent variables to test hypothesis 1 and 2 are ordinal, multilevel
ordered logistic regression models are employed as displayed in Table 1.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that higher economic resources result in a higher level of provided expert
information. Model 1 does indeed show a positive and significant effect for economic resources
(P<0.001). Model 2 adds actor and issue level controls. Although the effect size decreases and the
significance drops from P<0.001 to P<0.05, the main effect remains. In line with hypothesis 1, the
results show a positive association between economic resources and the provision of expert
information. However, Model 2 shows that a group’s political capacities are valuable as well
(P<0.001). The magnitude of the coefficients indicates that the effect of political capacities on
the provision of expert information is even stronger than of economic resources, which is also
supported by Figure 1.8 The figure shows the effect of each type of resource on expert information,
comparing the effects from low levels to high levels of either type of resource. While both
economic resources and political capacities show a significant increase from low (blue, left) to
high (red, right) levels, the increase for low to high levels of political capacities is somewhat
steeper. This suggests that groups without economic resources can gather and provide expert in-
formation by relying on their political capacities. In fact, an additional analysis (not shown) run on
a sample excluding actors that score 3 or higher on economic resources shows strong and signifi-
cant (P<0.001) effects for political capacities. Hence, actors with no or low levels of economic
resources can make use of their political capacities and still provide expert information.9
Models 3 and 4 test hypothesis 2, that is, whether an actor’s political capacities are related to the
provision of information about public preferences, the idea being that groups learn through inter-
actions with members and constituents about their preferences. Model 3 shows a significant and
positive effect for political capacities (P<0.001) as well as economic resources (P<0.05). However,
adding actor and issue-level controls in Model 4, the effect for economic resources decreases and
the significance drops to P<0.1, while the effect for political capacities stays significant (P<0.001).
Figure 2 illustrates that the increase from low (blue, left) to high (red, right) levels of economic
resources is marginal, while higher levels of political capacities are associated with more
information on public preferences. Hence in line with hypothesis 2, the analysis shows a positive
relationship between an actor’s political capacities and the level of provided information about
public preferences.
With regard to the added control variables, Model 2 shows that the different types of actors do
not differ from citizen groups with regard to the amount of expert information they provide. Only
experts are more likely to provide expert information compared to citizen groups (P<0.01), which
does not come as a surprise. According to Model 4, business groups provide significantly less
information on public preferences than citizen groups (P<0.01). Thus, those that typically have
8The figures show the predicted margins calculated with mixed-effect models instead of multilevel ordered logistic models
for high and low levels of resources and with 95% confidence intervals.
9An additional test interacting economic resources with political capacities shows a negative significant effect (P=0.06), i.e.,
the effect of political capacities is especially strong for low levels of economic resources (not shown).
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more interactions with members and the public, that is, citizen groups, are more likely to provide
information on public preferences. Running the models without controlling for actor types reveals
similar results, whereby the effect of economic resources on information on public preferences
even fails to achieve significance at the 0.1 level (not shown). This demonstrates that it is more
important what kind of resources a group has, irrespective of the type of organization. For both
types of information the effect of outside activities is positive and highly significant (P<0.001).
While the inclusion of this variable does not take away the effect of political capacities, it is an
important independent factor. The correlation between Outside Activities and Political Capacities
is quite high (0.63, see also Online Appendix C2); however, the VIF test suggests that correlation













Economic resources 0.32*** 0.24* 0.19* 0.17+
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Political capacities 1.15*** 0.73*** 1.56*** 0.99***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17)
Actor-level controls
Group type (Ref: citizen groups)
Professional groups 0.20 −0.21
(0.31) (0.29)
Business groups and firms 0.35 −1.00**
(0.32) (0.31)
Experts and others 0.77** −0.06
(0.29) (0.27)





Organizational salience 0.34** 0.10
(0.10) (0.10)
Outside activities 0.44*** 0.68***
(0.12) (0.12)
Issue-level controls
Media salience (log) 0.05 0.04
(0.10) (0.08)






UK 1.14** 1.09* 0.62 0.36
(0.44) (0.50) (0.46) (0.43)
Denmark −0.04 −0.31 0.09 −0.31
(0.38) (0.43) (0.40) (0.37)
Sweden −0.25 −0.45 −0.07 −0.27
(0.41) (0.45) (0.44) (0.38)
Netherlands 0.26 −0.08 1.06** 0.79*
(0.38) (0.42) (0.41) (0.36)
Policy intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of advocates 383 383 383 383
Number of issues 45 45 45 45
AIC 1901 1871 1486 1416
+P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001
aVIF scores range from 1.19 to 3.03, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem.
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between the variables does not introduce problematic multicollinearity to the model. Nevertheless,
the analysis has been run excluding the variable outside activities (see Online Appendix F). The
effects for economic resources and political capacities on expert information remain unchanged
(Model F1). However, the effect for economic resources on information about public preferences
becomes significant at P<0.05 (instead of P<0.1), while the effect of political capacities stays the
same (Model F2). This could suggest that economic resources are quite important for outside
activities such as big campaigns and events, yet less so for acquiring more politicized information.
Furthermore, the more an actor considers an issue to be relevant, the more expert information the
actor provides (P<0.01). Surprisingly, more information on public preferences is provided on
regulatory issues than on distributive issues (P<0.05). However, this could also be caused by
the types of issues that made it into the sample, which is why this finding should be interpreted
with caution. The same holds for the finding that information on public preferences is more likely
Figure 1. (Colour online) Predicted amount of expert information for low (blue, left) and high (red, right) levels of resources
with 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2. (Colour online) Predicted amount of information on public preferences for low (blue, left) and high (red, right)
levels of resources with 95% confidence intervals.
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in the Netherlands compared to Germany (P<0.05) and that expert information is more likely in
the UK than in Germany (P<0.05).
The analyses only test for effects of two types of resources on, firstly, expert information and,
secondly, information about public preferences. It does not allow for making any inferences as to
whether one resource is more valuable for one type of information than the other type of infor-
mation. That is, the analysis does not test whether economic resources are more important for
expert information than for information about public preferences, nor whether political capacities
have stronger effects on information about public preferences than on expert information. Online
Appendix J provides an analysis of such an alternative way of approaching this question. It shows
Table 2. Multilevel logistic regression models with random intercepts for policy issues







Economic resources 0.17 0.09
(0.13) (0.15)
Political capacities 1.52*** 0.88***
(0.20) (0.24)
Actor-level controls
Group type (Ref: citizen groups)
Professional groups −0.11
(0.46)
Business groups and firms −1.23*
(0.48)
Experts and others −0.16
(0.41)










Media saliency (log) −0.10
(0.12)
















Policy intercept Yes Yes
Number of actors 383 383
Number of issues 45 45
AIC 418 382
+P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001
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that political capacities are more important for information about public preferences than for
expert information. Furthermore, economic resources are more important for expert information,
yet the differences are not significant. While this additional analysis compares the effect for one
resource across different types of information, the main hypotheses intend to compare the effect of
two types of resources on either type of information.
Table 2 finally presents the models to test hypothesis 3, which argues that economic resources are
likely to affect the provision of a combination of both types of information. Given that the depen-
dent variable to test hypothesis 3 is binary, multilevel logistic regression analysis is employed.
Model 5 shows the effects for providing a combination of information. Surprisingly, yet in line
with the previous results, political capacities have a positive and significant effect on providing a
combination of information (P<0.001), which does not change after adding actor and issue-level
controls. Hence, contrary to what was expected in H3, economic resources have no effect and do
not result in providing both types of information. In contrast, more political capacities allow for
the provision of a combination of information as shown in Figure 3. The predicted probability of
providing a combination of information types increases from 58% to 63% for the observed range
of economic resources and from 26% to 82% across the observed range of political capacities.
The control variables for these models show that citizen groups are more likely to provide a
combination than business groups (P<0.05). Again, organizational salience and outside activities
have a positive and significant effect on the provision of a combination (P<0.05 and P<0.001).
Summarizing the findings for the hypotheses, the paper shows that while economic resources
are arguably valuable for information provision (cf. Klüver, 2012), it depends on the type of in-
formation and, moreover, that other resources are valuable as well. It confirms the argument by
Dür and Mateo (2013) on strategies: Not all interest group activity requires a high budget, and the
interaction with members and supporters generates information and knowledge as well (ibid.).
This also speaks to a line of research that looks more at the internal organization of groups
and how they interact with their members. Groups that want to transmit the preferences of their
members and constituents to policymakers have to be attentive to their members’ preferences
(Albareda, 2018). This, however, requires certain organizational features that facilitate the align-
ment of preferences with members (Kohler-Koch, 2010) such as consultations, internal surveys,
plenary discussions, meetings, and working groups (Albareda, 2018). These types of interactions
allow group leaders to learn about their members’ preferences. Importantly, these interactions also
Figure 3. (Colour online) Predicted probabilities of an actor providing a combination of information at low (blue, left) and
high (red, right) levels of resources with 95% confidence intervals.
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allow groups to learn more about technical aspects of a policy proposal as many members may
have hands-on experience (Wright, 1996: 94).
This also supports the idea that political capacities may help compensating potentially lacking
economic resources when providing expert information, which becomes even more obvious in the
last model that considers when actors provide both types of information. The results for the effect
of resources on providing both types of information show that it is not actors with economic
resources that persist but that the knowledge and information gained through political capacities
may help groups provide information. Moreover, the few differences across actor type suggest that
the mechanism works via the resources a group has, irrespective of the type of group. This would
also mean that group type cannot necessarily be used as a proxy for the types of information a
group possesses (cf. Dür and Mateo, 2014) and explain why empirical studies have not found
differences across group types with regard to expert information (De Bruycker, 2016; Nownes
and Newmark, 2016).
Robustness
The effects have also been tested with different model specifications. First, the ordinal models have
been run as multilevel OLS regression models (see Online Appendix G). The effects for both
resources on expert information stay the same. While the effect for political capacities on infor-
mation on public preferences also stays the same, the significance for the effect of economic
resources fails to reach significance (Model G2). As an alternative operationalization of economic
resources, Online Appendix H provides models that use a logged version of an organization’s staff
size on the issue. This variable was measured with a survey question asking about staff efforts in
full-time equivalents that only received 226 answers. In line with the results, the effect for orga-
nizational staff is significant for expert information but not for information on public preferences
or a combination of information. Moreover, in spite of the missing data the effects for political
capacities on political and expert information are similar. Lastly, the two ordinal dependent
variables have been recoded into binary variables (see Online Appendix I). Values above 3.5 were
coded as 1, indicating that this type of information was provided often and values below were
coded as 0, indicating that this information has rarely been provided. Again, the results show
a positive and significant effect of economic resources and political capacities on expert informa-
tion (Model I1), yet only a positive and significant effect for political resources and not economic
resources in a model testing for the provision of information on public preferences (Model I2). In
sum, the different analyses show robust results for the strong positive effect of political capacities
on the provision of information on public preferences. Furthermore, there is evidence that
economic resources increase the level of provided expert information. There is also quite robust
evidence that political capacities are relevant for the provision of expert information. This could
suggest that even when advocates have only low economic resources, they could draw on their
political capacities and still provide expert information. Moreover, political resources are relevant
for providing information on public preferences as well as a combination of information, rejecting
the idea that economic resources are key for informational lobbying.
Conclusion
This paper started out to explore the resources that are necessary for an interest group to provide
information to policymakers as it argued that information is not only a resource when lobbying
policymakers, but requires resources in itself. While much of the academic literature has
highlighted the importance of economic resources and the power of financially well-endowed
groups, the paper argued that different information types may require different types of resources.
The paper puts forward predictions arguing that political capacities are more important for
information on public preferences than economic resources while economic resources are more
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relevant for expert information than political capacities. Furthermore, it hypothesized that finan-
cially well-endowed actors can use their financial resources to nevertheless access information on
public preferences. The predictions were tested using a novel dataset on interest group activity on
50 specific policy issues in five West European countries.
The results show a positive relationship between economic resources and the provision of
expert information as well as between political capacities and the provision of information on
public preferences. Interestingly, the availability of political capacities also seems to enable groups
to provide expert information. These findings suggest that groups can use political capacities to
access expert information even if they do not have high levels of economic resources. This also
explains why groups with political capacities are able to provide a combination of both types of
information, which, ultimately, may allow more efficient lobbying through the provision of
different types of information. A potential explanation is that groups do not only learn about
preferences when they interact with their members and supporters but also gather policy relevant
expert information (Wright, 1996; Johansson and Lee, 2014; Albareda, 2018). Hence, close inter-
actions with citizens and knowledge on public preferences seem to be valuable resources for an
interest group that can be used for providing information to policymakers. Such interactions do
not necessarily require a budget to be spent on hiring expertise or conducting a study but are
relatively easily accessible.
Thus, even though the present study illustrates that information provision is costly (Austen-
Smith andWright, 1992; Wright, 1996), the costs vary and are not only of a financial nature which
means that informational lobbying does not necessarily favour economically well-endowed groups
(Schattschneider, 1960). Moreover, assuming that interest groups act as transmission belts by
transmitting information to policymakers (Bevan and Rasmussen, 2017; Eising and Spohr,
2017), the paper illustrates the ability of interest groups to work as a transmission belt, indepen-
dent of the financial resources they have.
Arguably, there are limits as to how much one can generalize based on a sample of five West
European countries and 50 policy issues. However, relying on issues that represent a broad range
of topics and vary with regard to media salience, public support, and policy type should at least
increase the likelihood of generalizability to a broader set of issues. It is important to bear in mind,
though, that the issues in the sample may be more salient than an average issue given that they
were sampled from opinion polls. This could mean that access to information – especially
information on public preferences –may have been somewhat easier and therefore less costly than
on less salient issues. A potential next step would be to look more closely at how organizations
acquire their information and also when they do so to see how and whether this is determined by
the issue context. Moreover, although the paper does not offer direct proof that the findings are
generalizable to other countries, the theoretical mechanisms outlined in the paper should also
apply to other European democracies. Nevertheless, a future contribution could look at informa-
tional lobbying in younger democracies in which interest groups may be less involved in
policymaking. Another caveat is that the study only includes interest groups that have mobilized
on the issue, which means these groups had some resources that allowed them to mobilize and
provide information. This could suggest that the findings underestimate potential biases intro-
duced by information transmission and the resources that are necessary to do so. Future research
could analyse the internal information flows of an organization with a more qualitative approach
to uncover the causal pathways of information. Lastly, the present study only sheds light on the
supply side of information. Given that policymakers need both types of information and that
interest groups should be more effective in lobbying if they provide a combination of information
types, the findings indicate that at least with regard to the information they provide, it is not only
those with a high budget that are able to inform policymakers. Yet we also know from the litera-
ture that interest groups predominantly provide expert information (Burstein, 2014; De Bruycker,
2016; Nownes and Newmark, 2016). This may be because they consider this the most important
and efficient type of information, in which case economically well-endowed groups are similarly
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well equipped. Future research could thus go one step further and test what type of information
policymakers actually want and, ultimately, consider the most, that is, what type of information is
most influential.
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